

Advice provided by Professor Wilson-Wilde to the 2022 Commission of Inquiry about Project 13, & Identification of Cases Affected by Project 13

I, Dr Kirsty Melanie Wright, do solemnly and sincerely declare that:

1. Since 2019 I have been employed as a contractor by the Australian Defence Force to provide specialist forensic science expert services for capability development and project support.
2. I am employed by the Royal Australian Air Force to provide expert opinion on human identification based on DNA. I have held this position as a Specialist Reservist since 2010.
3. In 2017 I completed a Doctor of Philosophy in forensic DNA human identification, and in 2000 was awarded a Bachelor's in Biomedical Science (Honours).
4. I have previously held positions as a Senior Lecturer in Forensic Sciences at Griffith University, a Reporting Scientist in the Major Crime Team at Queensland Health Forensic and Scientific Services (QHFSS), Senior Scientist of Queensland Health's Skeletal Remains Project, Manager of the National Criminal Investigation DNA Database (NCIDD) at CrimTrac, Disaster Victim Identification DNA Team Leader with the Australian Federal Police, Senior Scientist of the Northern Territory Skeletal Remains Project, and Forensic Biology Expert for INTERPOL's FASTID Project.
5. This statement has been prepared to understand what advice, if any, Professor Linzi Wilson-Wilde provided to the 2022 Commission of Inquiry into Forensic DNA Testing in Queensland (Col) about the Project 13 DNA recovery failures. It also raises questions about how Recommendation 105 has been addressed by Forensic Science Queensland (FSQ) to enable inclusion of cases affected by Project 13 in the case review.
6. This statement prepared by me is true and correct to the best of my knowledge based on the information I have received.

Summary

1. The 2022 Col explored issues raised by the Shandee's Story podcast and uncovered unknown issues that led to major reforms and historical case reviews. Professor Linzi Wilson-Wilde was employed by the Col as an independent expert to examine a DNA extraction method that had known contamination issues (Project 13). There is evidence in her expert report that she examined the Project 13 report thoroughly. In my opinion, the scope of the review was sufficient for her to detect unknown issues, such as poor DNA recovery, and she was provided with a range of documents that enabled her to detect this. Professor Wilson-Wilde asserts she found the DNA yield failure in Project 13, and informed the Col, however, in my opinion there is no evidence to support this.

2. In my examination of the advice Professor Wilson-Wilde gave to the Col about Project 13, it was necessary for me to review and understand Professor Wilson-Wilde's public comments. I have done this and found she provided a range of explanations about her examination of Project 13 during the Col, and the advice she gave. In my opinion, none are sufficiently supported by evidence, they do not make sense, and some are contradictory. Due to these difficulties, I am left in a position where it is still unclear to me what actions Professor Wilson-Wilde took, if any, to advise the Col of the failed DNA recovery issue contained in Project 13.
3. Retired Judge Julie Dick and the Honourable Shannon Fentiman have made public statements (and audio records of these are available) where they assert Professor Wilson-Wilde was confined to the contamination issue and that another scientist dealt with the yield failure. In my opinion, these false assertions appear to have originated from Professor Wilson-Wilde. If so, this suggests that Professor Wilson-Wilde has misled both Chairs of the DNA Advisory Board (including Walter Sofronoff) and the Health Minister.
4. The 2022 Col included Recommendation 105 in its Final Report which tasked FSQ to find whether the DNA extraction method (arising from Project 13¹) was working sub-optimally and if so, the time period it was working sub-optimally for. If FSQ had addressed Recommendation 105, then Project 13 and the systemic failure from 2007 onwards would have been identified, and cases affected included in the historical case review being conducted by the Queensland Health DNA Taskforce. It was only after public statements made by me about Project 13, that an extra 7,000 serious crimes and sexual offences were identified as being affected in a review dating back to 2007 conducted by the Queensland Police Service (QPS). This raises some serious and concerning questions about how FSQ addressed Recommendation 105.
5. In my opinion, if Professor Wilson-Wilde failed to advise the Col of the DNA yield failure while she was an expert witness. If FSQ failed to appropriately address Recommendation 105, it needs to be understood how and why this occurred. Each of these potential failings risked the proper review of thousands of serious and violent crimes and proper re-testing of evidence. This is why I believe these issues should be addressed in this Inquiry.

Col Direction and Scope of Professor Wilson-Wilde's Review

6. Professor Linzi Wilson-Wilde was employed by the 2022 Col to provide independent expert advice on a DNA extraction method (arising from Project 13) used by the Queensland Health Forensic and Scientific Services DNA Analysis Unit (QHFSS). She was provided with two over-arching directions²:

¹ At the time of the 2022 Col, Project 13 was not publicly known to have documented the failed DNA recovery prior to the method's implementation in 2007. Therefore, it was unknown how long the method was failing. It was only revealed in Module 6 that data from the extraction method between 2012 to 2013 was producing poor results.

² EXH 129.5, page 10.

- i. *You have been engaged to review the documentation provided and determine whether the scientific testing process for use of the DNA IQ instrument was scientifically sound and conducted in accordance with international best practice.*
 - ii. *In addition, you will also consider the audit and investigation reports and whether the analysis employed was scientifically sound and in accordance with international best practice.*
7. Professor Wilson-Wilde was further instructed to provide advice to the Commission as to:
1. *Whether the methods, systems and processes in relation to using the DNA IQ instrument was consistent with international best practice when issues arose in and around 2008, including consideration of the following particular issues:*
 - i. *Whether the process that QHFSS introduced, first using automated liquid handler platforms in October 2007 and then commencing processing with 'off deck lysis' in March 2008, to perform automated DNA IQ extractions was consistent with international best practice.*
 - ii. *Whether adequate training following the implementation of DNA IQ could have prevented the contamination issue, with reference to Audit 8227 "Process Audit of Automated DNA IQ System (including Off-Deck Lysis)" (3.3 - Audit Report - 'Audit 8227. Process audit of automated DNA IQ System (including off-deck lysis)'.*
 2. *Whether the identification, investigation/s and resolution of the DNA IQ issues was appropriate and consistent with international best practice.*
 3. *Whether the amended methods, systems and processes implemented for using the DNA IQ instrument was consistent with international best practice.*
 4. *If any deficiency in the methods, systems or processes for use of the DNA IQ instrument or the resolution of the issue that arose in and around 2008 is found, the impact of that deficiency on:*
 - i. *Whether the obtaining of a useable DNA profile from a sample by the laboratory was reliable and accurate;*
 - ii. *Whether DNA profiles obtained by the laboratory are reliable and accurate.*
 5. The scope of review requested by the Col was not limited to the contamination issue, which was already known by the Col and fixed by QHFSS in 2008 and 2009. The Col was triggered by an investigation led by The Australian newspaper who found a systemic failure by QHFSS to obtain DNA profiles when expected. Therefore, the broad scope of the directions provided to Professor Wilson-Wilde was likely intended to capture any and all issues that could affect successful DNA profiling outcomes. Simply put, the Col did not know, and did not have the expertise, to detect the full

range of technical issues that may exist, and therefore, relied on experts to examine and report undiscovered issues.

Opportunity to Detect the DNA Yield Failures at the Col

6. The Col provided Professor Wilson-Wilde with a range of documents to examine. In my opinion, some of those contained clear evidence of the DNA failure³. Given the failed DNA extraction method arose from Project 13, I believe it should have been the priority document for Professor Wilson-Wilde to examine. There is evidence in her expert report that she examined the Project 13 report thoroughly, and in my opinion should have easily seen the DNA recovery failure. Table 1 lists documents and the multiple pieces of evidence contained within them that I believe clearly demonstrate the systemic DNA recovery failure, and the severity of it.

³ EXH 129.5, p13 to p20, 'Appendix 2-Index of information provided and considered'.

Table 1: Evidence of the failed DNA method in documents provided to Professor Wilson-Wilde by the Col in 2022.

Document	Evidence
Project 13. Report on the verification of an automated DNA IQ protocol using the MultiPROBE II PLUS HT EX Gripper integration platform.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="506 360 2087 419">1. In my opinion, Figures 9 to 12 clearly shows the automated method was systemically failing and recovered far less DNA than the manual method. <li data-bbox="506 467 2087 499">2. The automated method was failing to recover DNA at the 1/1000, 1/100 dilutions for blood on rayon swabs (Figure 9). <li data-bbox="506 539 2087 598">3. The automated method was struggling to obtain DNA from 1/10 dilutions and neat blood for both swab types (Figures 9 and 10). <li data-bbox="506 646 2087 678">4. The automated method was recovering far less DNA for cells on both swab types (Figures 10 and 11). <li data-bbox="506 726 2087 865">5. The report states: “<i>When dilutions of either blood or cells were applied onto either rayon or cotton swabs followed by extraction using the DNA IQ method, the results of the automated method were always lower in yield compared to the manual method</i>” Page 12, paragraph 2). In my opinion, the magnitude of the DNA recovery failure is clear in Figures 9 to 12. <li data-bbox="506 912 2087 978">6. The report states: “<i>For blood samples on rayon swabs, the automated method generated yields that were on average around 8% (SD 8.45%) of the automated [manual] method</i>”. Page 13, paragraph 1. This means the automated method recovered 92% less DNA than the manual method for blood on rayon swabs. <li data-bbox="506 1090 2087 1197">7. The report states: “<i>For blood on cotton swabs, the yield from the automated method was also around 8% (SD 3.62%). The yields for cell samples were higher at around 33% (SD 16.29%) and 25% (10.32%) for cells on rayon and cotton swabs respectively</i>”. Page 13, paragraph 1. This means the automated method recovered 92% less DNA than the manual method for blood on cotton swabs. For cells on rayon swabs the automated method recovered 67% less DNA than the manual method, and for cells on cotton swabs the automated method recovered 75% less DNA than the manual method.

	<p>8. The report states: <i>“The manual method was found to be more sensitive than the automated method. Out of five replicates at the 1/100 and 1/1000 dilutions for blood on rayon swabs that were processed using the manual method, five and three replicates respectively were detected (and none from the automated method) (see Figure 9).”</i> Page 13, paragraph 2.</p> <p>This means that the automated method failed to recover detectable DNA on all 1/100 and 1/1000 dilutions of blood on rayon swabs. This represents all samples of trace blood found at crime scenes, which in my opinion, is a clear and significant failing.</p> <p>9. Figure 5 to 8 also reveal the method was failing to consistently recover DNA. The figures show large variations between DNA recovery from blood samples and large variations between the recovery of DNA from cell samples. It also shows that some blood and cell samples failed (eg Figure 5, Column 3, Row G; Column 9, Row G; Figure 7, Column 7 Rows G and C).</p> <p>10. In my opinion, the abstract clearly contradicts the results, stating: <i>“Data indicate that results from the automated procedure are comparable to those from the manual procedure”</i>. Page 1, paragraph 1.</p> <p>11. Significant contamination was detected in Project 13 with one out of five plates tested containing 12 instances of contamination. Rather than investigating the contamination and fixing it during Project 13, the results were ‘invalidated’. Page 9, paragraph 4, page 10 Table 5. In my opinion, invalidating the failed plate in this instance was a way of dismissing unfavourable data so it would not be considered in the final evaluation of the method.</p> <p>12. The abstract incorrectly states: <i>“Contamination checks were performed using samples prepared in checkerboard and zebra-stripe format, and results were as expected”</i>. Page 1, paragraph 1.</p> <p>13. The report is incomplete with large sections missing, even incomplete sentences and ‘???’ within the body.</p> <p>14. The date of the report is August 2008, which is ten months after the method was introduced (October 2007).</p>
Project 21. A modified DNA IQ method consisting	<p>1. ‘QC Blood’ (quality control blood) samples were trialled with the modified method, and both failed (0.0700 ng/ul, and 0.0991 ng/ul). Page 2, Table 4. These samples were made in the same way as those in Project 13 resulted in even <u>less</u> DNA. The</p>

of off-deck lysis to allow supernatant retention for presumptive identification of α -Amylase.	<p>average concentration for the manual method was 3.0 ng/ul and was therefore the target concentration for the automated method.</p> <p>2. 'QC cells' (quality control cells) samples were trialled with the modified method, and both failed (0.1030 ng/ul, and 0.0582 ng/ul). Page 2, Table 4.</p>
Project 22. A modified DNA IQ method for off-deck lysis prior to performing automated DNA extraction	<p>1. Table 3 shows blood samples were still failing (concentration range 0.8140 ng/ul to 1.7400 ng/ul). Page 4.</p> <p>2. Table 3 shows cell samples were still failing (concentration range 0.0999 ng/ul to 0.4530 ng/ul. Page 4.</p> <p>3. A second data set for blood on rayon swabs shows samples were still failing (0.7352 ng/ul, 0.4698 ng/ul, and 0.2106 ng/ul). Page 6, Table 6.</p> <p>4. The report states: <i>"For buccal cell samples, however, the Thermomixer samples (set 3) produced more undetermined results (0 ng/ul) compared to the hot block samples *st 1), but most results were generally low and close to the validated LOD of 0.00426 ng/ul and therefore indistinguishable from the background."</i> Page 7, paragraph 1.</p> <p>This means that the authors stated most cell samples they trialled with the modified method failed to produce DNA profiles.</p> <p>5. Table 7 further demonstrates the systemic failure of the modified automated method to obtain DNA profiles from cells. Page 7. 'NRs' are not reportable alleles, that is, pieces of DNA that were not profiled. Set 1 has 52/64 NRs, Set 2 has 39/40 NRs, and Set 3 has 14/14 NRs. In my opinion, this is a clear failure of the method.</p>
Report – A review of DNA extraction control results obtained in the second six months of 2008 (Harvey & McNevin).	<p>1. The internal audit of 220 positive blood extraction controls found 19 did not obtain complete DNA profiles (9 partial profiles, 8 low level profiles, 2 no profile.) This represents an 8.6% failure of each extraction batch (or 1 failed batch for every 12 batches), when it should be 0% or a very rare occurrence.</p>

7. Twelve instances of contamination were found in one out of five plates tested in Project 13. In my opinion, this is significant and very concerning contamination. However, rather than investigate and fix the source of contamination, a decision was made by QHFSS to 'invalidate' the plate, meaning the results were not considered, which I believe is poor scientific practice in this instance. The abstract incorrectly states:

*"Contamination checks were performed using samples prepared in checkerboard and zebra-stripe format, and results were as expected"*⁴.

8. Professor Wilson-Wilde asserts she focused on the contamination issues with Project 13, however in my opinion, she did not accurately convey the level of contamination to the Col. She stated:

*"Significantly, it is noted that one of the runs was invalidated due to the presence of an unknown profile that could not be identified"*⁵.

9. While Professor Wilson-Wilde stated that should have resulted in further testing, and considers the verification was '*not consistent with good practice*'⁶, in my opinion, she failed to accurately convey the level of contamination (twelve samples) to the Col, the incorrect conclusion of the contamination test results in the abstract, or that invalidating the contaminated plate was poor scientific practice. After my review of Project 13, I concluded it was clear from the level of contamination observed, and the failure to fix it, that the method would lead to contamination after implementation.

10. Professor Wilson-Wilde late states:

*"Given the number of contamination events that occurred when using the DNA IQ method in 2007-2008, it could be that the method was not sufficiently validated. It is surprising that the level of contamination was not identified during the validation"*⁷.

11. In my opinion, her advice '*it could be that the method was not sufficiently validated*' does not convey the complete failure of Project 13 in many aspects to the Col. My conclusion was the level of contamination seen post-implementation was observed in Project 13. If this was accurately conveyed, perhaps the Col would have examined the failed method further, rather than accepting the method was fixed and producing accurate and reliable results.

12. In my opinion, the four graphs that feature in the Project 13 report (Figures 9 to 12⁸) clearly shows the catastrophic and systemic yield failures for the automated method compared to the manual method. I believe it also shows the two methods are not comparable as the Project 13 report abstract incorrectly states.

⁴ COI EXH 129.5, p1, paragraph 1.

⁵ COI EXH129.5, page 4, paragraph 32.

⁶ COI EXH 129.5, page 4, paragraph 32.

⁷ COI EXH 129.5, page 8, paragraph 65.

⁸ Col EXH 129.95, pages 13 to 16.




Figure 9. Comparison of sensitivity between the manual and automated DNA IQ™ methods for blood samples on rayon swabs.




Figure 10. Comparison of sensitivity between the manual and automated DNA IQ™ methods for blood samples on cotton swabs.




Figure 11. Comparison of sensitivity between the manual and automated DNA IQ™ methods for cells samples on rayon swabs.




Figure 12. Comparison of sensitivity between the manual and automated DNA IQ™ methods for cell samples on cotton swabs.

13. Based on my review of the Project 13 report, it is unclear to me how someone with Professor Wilson-Wilde's credentials and experience failed to report the systemic DNA recovery failure to the Col. I also believe it ought to have been clear to her the impact the failed method would have had on criminal cases, police investigations, and court proceedings.

Lack of evidence to support that Professor Wilson-Wilde advised the Col of the DNA recovery failure

14. In my opinion, there are eight reasons that support Professor Wilson-Wilde did not advise the Col of the systemic DNA recovery failure when she was engaged as an independent expert. These are:
- i. There is no evidence in Professor Wilson-Wilde's report dated 20 October 2022 of the yield failure (instead, her report supports the reliability of the method to obtain profiles);
 - ii. Susan Hedge's summary of Professor Wilson-Wilde's review of the method did not reveal the yield failure (her summary supports that the method is obtaining profiles when it is expected to);
 - iii. Information of the failed method was not provided to me, Dr Budowle, or Jo Veth (independent experts employed by the Col to review the Blackburn DNA analysis for Module 6) by the Col despite it being critically relevant, and known to Professor Wilson-Wilde over one month earlier;
 - iv. Recommendation 105 is based on Module 6 findings that one extraction method used for the Blackburn matter was failing in 2013. The systemic failure of the method prior to its introduction (demonstrated in Project 13) was unknown to Module 6 experts. The recommendation seeks to find '*if this extraction method was performing sub-optimally, and if so, the period of time in which a sub-optimal method was used*'. If Professor Wilson-Wilde had disclosed the Project 13 yield failure to the Col, I believe recommendation 105 would not be seeking to understand if the method was working sub-optimally, and for how long.
 - v. The DNA Advisory Board, which Walter Sofronoff KC Chairs, did not know about Project 13 and the yield failures, despite it being relevant to their oversight of delivery of Col recommendations. Professor Wilson-Wilde admitted to The Australian in September 2023 she had not told the DNA Advisory Board of the yield failures, despite discovering it in October 2022 (nearly one year earlier), and several months after the first DNA Advisory Board meeting on 28 March 2023⁹. If Professor Wilson-Wilde had advised the Col of the method failure, I believe the DNA Advisory Board would have known about Project 13 and its significant failings.

⁹ 'Queensland Government First Progress Report, Delivery of Recommendations, Commission of Inquiry into Forensic DNA Testing in Queensland'. Page 8.

- vi. It was only in October 2023 that the Government announced another 7,000 cases would be added to the historical case review based on the public revelations about Project 13. If Professor Wilson-Wilde advised the Col of this, I believe these cases would have already been part of the Queensland Health DNA Taskforce case review.
- vii. If Professor Wilson-Wilde had advised the Col of the yield failures in Project 13, I believe the Col would have relayed this critical information to Coroner David O'Connell, who is conducting the Coronial investigation into the Blackburn matter, and who is directing the retesting of the crime scene evidence.
- viii. There are no details of the Project 13 DNA yield failure in the Col Final Report.

These eight areas are discussed in more detail below.

15. There is no evidence in Professor Wilson-Wilde's report dated 20 October 2022 that she disclosed the yield failure to the Col. Nowhere in the report did she state anything about the drop in yield, that the method was 'flawed' or failed to obtain DNA when it should, or that the automated method was not comparable to the manual method. I believe this issue should have been the priority topic for her report to the Col given the yield failure was unknown, unresolved (unlike the contamination issue), and would have led to offenders not being identified and cases not being resolved.

16. One of the most relevant sections for Professor Wilson-Wilde to report this is for Question 4 a), which asks:

"if any deficiency in the methods, systems or processes for use of the DNA IQ instrument or the resolution of the issue that arose in and around 2008 is found, the impact of that deficiency on: a) Whether the obtaining of a useable DNA profile from a sample by the laboratory was reliable and accurate".

17. However, Professor Wilson-Wilde concludes that results could be considered reliable and accurate. In my opinion, this finding completely contradicts the failures that Professor Wilson-Wilde claims she found when reviewing the Project 13 report¹⁰.

18. Counsel Assisting Susan Hedge relays Professor Wilson-Wilde's advice to the Inquiry in her address to the Commissioner.

"Finally can we turn to the impact on results. Can we turn to paragraph 65 to 69 first please. The question that was asked here is whether the obtaining of a usable DNA profile was reliable and accurate, that is whether you do obtain one when you should and not obtain one when you shouldn't, as opposed to the accuracy of that profile, which was a second question."¹¹

19. Susan Hedge then summarises Professor Wilson-Wilde's findings from her report (based on paragraphs 65 to 69 which responds to question 4. a).

¹⁰ Professor Wilson-Wilde's public explanations all include her finding the yield failure. Her very clear position was that she did not miss the yield issues in Project 13.

¹¹ Col transcript 24 October 2022, page 5, paragraphs 3-8.

“And in these paragraphs Professor Wilson-Wilde concludes that after the retesting and the investigation was done, none of the results released cause a concern about reliability or accuracy.”¹²

20. Upon hearing this, I believe Professor Wilson-Wilde should have corrected Susan Hedge’s misunderstanding. From my review of Project 13, it was clear Susan Hedge’s summary was incorrect.
21. Professor Wilson-Wilde provided her report and verbal advice to the Col in October 2022. If she had disclosed the yield failure to the Col as she asserts, I believe the Col would have provided this information to me, Dr Budowle, and Jo Veth as a priority to enable us to conduct an accurate review of the Blackburn DNA testing. By late November 2022, one month later, we were not advised by the Col of the yield failure.
22. The Module 6 hearings discussed the method failure in 2013 that me, Dr Budowle, and Jo Veth detected, our concern, and concern of the Commissioner, about the impact of the failure on the Blackburn matter, other matters, and our uncertainty about when the failure commenced. I believe Professor Wilson-Wilde should have shared her knowledge that she already knew the method was failing at the time of implementation in 2007.
23. The Col final report was released on 13 December 2022. Recommendation 105 stated:

“The laboratory should conduct a retrospective review of positive control extraction batches processed by the MultiProbe® II instrument to determine if this extraction method was performing sub-optimally, and if so, the period of time in which a sub-optimal method was used and whether there is utility in retesting or re-analysing any potentially affected samples.”
24. This recommendation was made despite Professor Wilson-Wilde allegedly reporting the yield failure she observed in Project 13 in her October 2022 report to the Col, and verbally to Counsel Assisting. That is, at the time recommendation 105 was drafted, then released, Professor Wilson-Wilde claims she already knew the method was failing when it was introduced in 2007, and she had direct proof of that. I believe Professor Wilson-Wilde should have alerted the Col of the yield failures she observed in Project 13 after she read recommendation 105.
25. The DNA Advisory Board Chairs were appointed on 23 January 2023. Professor Wilson-Wilde states she recommended names of scientific experts for the Advisory Board in November 2022¹³, demonstrating close contact and opportunity to disclose the Project 13 failings prior to completion of the Col. The first DNA Advisory Board meeting was held on 28 March 2023, and *‘an interim process for reviewing past or historical cases that may have been impacted by sub-optimal laboratory processes*

¹² Col transcript 24 October 2022, page 5, paragraphs 8-11.

¹³ See Attachment 2, paragraphs 2 and 3.

*has been developed and operationalised*¹⁴ by April 2023. This suggests to me the DNA Advisory Board, including the Commissioner of the Col, was not aware of the DNA extraction failures that Professor Wilson-Wilde claims to have reported in October 2022, when I believe these people should have been made aware. I believe Professor Wilson-Wilde should have informed the DNA Advisory Board of the DNA yield failure as a priority.

26. In my opinion, if Professor Wilson-Wilde had disclosed the yield failure during the Col, recommendation 105 would have been already traced back to Project 13, and the Queensland Health DNA Taskforce would have included all major crime cases affected by this in the historical case review. It appears this did not happen, which I believe is concerning given Professor Wilson-Wilde was later appointed CEO of Forensic Science Queensland and had ample opportunity to convey this issue.
27. It appears that it was only revelations in the media in September 2023 that led to the government's awareness of the DNA recovery failure, and the need to review a further 7,000 cases. If Professor Wilson-Wilde knew about the Project 13 failures during the Col, I believe she should have advised the Queensland Health DNA Taskforce and relevant government officials. It does not appear that this occurred.
28. The Module 6 discovery of the method failure, based on 2012 to 2013 results, did not enable an understanding of when the method started to fail. During Module 6 it was assumed the method had suddenly stopped working at some point after implementation. If so, this could have been caused by many issues (such as a broken robot part, a software glitch, a bad batch of chemicals, another key laboratory instrument not working, a fridge or freezer failure, chemicals being made incorrectly, and so on).
29. Having an exact understanding of what caused the failure is critical to the Coroner developing a strategy to retest the Blackburn crime scene evidence as part of the Coronial investigation. Without this knowledge, in my opinion, simply retesting the samples in a standard way would almost certainly lead to their failure. Compounding this, it would be unknown that the results failed. That is, the result would be 'no DNA detected', which would be accepted as an accurate and reliable result. I believe if the Col knew about the DNA recovery failure, they would have advised the Coroner.
30. If Professor Wilson-Wilde disclosed the Project 13 DNA recovery failure during the Col as she claims, I believe there would have been a significant section in the Col Final Report dedicated to this. She claims there was detail of the Project 13 failure in the Col Final Report, which is why she did not discuss this issue with the DNA Advisory Board. However, there is no discussion of the yield failure seen in Project 13 in the Col final report. In fact, a word search of the Final Report shows 'Project 13' is only found *once*, in a footnote referencing that QHFSS chose to conduct a verification, rather than a validation of the automated extraction method (ie Project 13).

¹⁴ 'Queensland Government First Progress Report, Delivery of Recommendations, Commission of Inquiry into Forensic DNA Testing in Queensland'. Page 8.

Professor Wilson-Wilde's explanations about what advice she gave to the Col about the Project 13 DNA recovery failure

31. In my review of what advice Professor Wilson-Wilde gave to the Col about Project 13 during the Col, it was necessary for me to understand public explanations she made. I have listened to and reviewed her public statements and found she provided a range of explanations about the advice she provided the Col. In my opinion, none of her explanations are sufficiently supported by evidence, and I am left in a position where it is still unclear to me what her actions were in relation to the disclosure of the failed DNA recovery issue contained in Project 13 to the Col.
32. When approached by journalists from The Australian newspaper in August and September 2023 for public clarification about what advice she gave to the Col, Professor Wilson-Wilde provided multiple explanations, some which appear contradictory. Further explanations were relayed publicly in the weeks after by retired Judge and DNA Advisory Board co-Chair Julie Dick and the Minister for Health, the Honourable Shannon Fentiman. Professor Wilson-Wilde asserts:
- i. She saw there was a significant reduction in yield, and went through each section of the Project 13 report in detail with the Col, including the yield issues.
 - ii. She advised the Col in her expert report that the method was flawed and the whole project should never have commenced.
 - iii. She saw the abstract was clearly contradictory to the body and the results of the project.
 - iv. She recognised there was *“a significant potential and a real world outcome that introducing a method with such a significant difference in the yield of DNA, that it would have had an impact on the ability to identify and retrieve DNA from crime scene samples”*.
 - v. She was asked by the Col to focus on the contamination issues.
 - vi. She was not asked by the Col to look at yield issues at all.
 - vii. The method was improved in 2009, and she reviewed these validation documents and saw the results were *“far better than the Project 13 results.”*
 - viii. Another scientist, Dr Bruce Budowle, was asked to investigate and dealt with the yield issues in his report dated 15 September 2022, and this report was provided to Professor Wilson-Wilde on 22 September 2022.
 - ix. The Project 13 issues were detailed in the Col Final Report, so she did not disclose the details to the DNA Advisory Board.
33. More detailed versions and references are available in Attachment 1, 2, and 3.

34. Retired Judge Julie Dick and the Honourable Shannon Fentiman have made public statements (and audio records of these are available¹⁵) where they assert Professor Wilson-Wilde was confined to the contamination issue and that another scientist dealt with the yield issue. In my opinion, these false assertions appear to have originated from Professor Wilson-Wilde. If so, this suggests that Professor Wilson-Wilde has misled both Chairs of the DNA Advisory Board (including Walter Sofronoff) and the Health Minister.
35. None of Professor Wilson-Wilde's explanations claim she missed the obvious and catastrophic yield failure in Project 13. It therefore appears that she discovered the failure during the Col. She stated she recognised the impact of the failure (see iv), which confirms she was aware of the seriousness of it during the Col. If she saw the yield failure, and recognised the seriousness of it, I believe Professor Wilson-Wilde should have included a detailed section in her expert report about this to the Col.
36. The scope of the review requested in writing by the Col did not limit Professor Wilson-Wilde to reporting just the contamination issue, nor did it indicate the review should be focused on the contamination issue. In my opinion even if it had, any reasonable scientist still would have alerted the Col to the systemic DNA yield failure immediately.
37. Nowhere in Professor Wilson-Wilde's expert report does it mention the DNA recovery failures or that the method was 'flawed', needed further investigation, or should never have gone ahead. If it had, I believe it would have led to further scrutiny by the Col.
38. If Professor Wilson-Wilde went through each section of Project 13 in detail with the Col as she claims, including the yield issues, I believe this would have been reflected in Susan Hedge's summary at the Col hearings. In my opinion, a non-scientist, including Susan Hedge, would have easily seen the Project 13 failings in Figures 9 to 12, and concluded the results were not 'comparable' as the abstract states.
39. Professor Wilson-Wilde asserts she reviewed validation documents from the amended versions of the Project 13 method, and found that results were '*far better than the Project 13 results*'. She claims this led her to believe there was not an ongoing yield issue with the method, however, in my opinion this is incorrect. The Col specifically asked Professor Wilson-Wilde to address the amended method in Question 3 of her report:

"Whether the amended methods, systems and processes implemented for using the DNA IQ instrument was consistent with international best practice".¹⁶

40. Professor Wilson-Wilde's response to this question was:

¹⁵ Hon Shannon Fentiman press conference 25 September 2023, Retired Judge Julie Dick press conference 20 September 2023.

¹⁶ Col EXH 129.5, page 7.

“If the amended methods have been demonstrated through validation/verification to operate as expected and produce reliable and reproducible results, then they can be considered suitable for implementation and use.”¹⁷

41. The key word in her above statement is ‘if’. This indicates that Professor Wilson-Wilde either did not check any further validation or verification documents which she was tasked to do by the Col (these were listed in the documents she received from the Col to undertake her task), or she checked them and found the method was still failing.
42. Documents provided to Professor Wilson-Wilde by the Col for her to review, in my opinion, clearly shows the method was still failing after its introduction, and after changes were made to the method.¹⁸
43. In a media interview on 20 September 2023 with retired Judge Julie Dick, co-Chair of the DNA Advisory Board, she advised that Dr Bruce Budowle provided a report that dealt with yield issues. In the interview Ms Dick confirmed that she had not read Professor Wilson-Wilde’s report, but had discussed the issue with her and Mr Sofronoff.¹⁹ It therefore appears that the public explanation and position taken by Ms Dick was informed by direct advice provided by Professor Wilson-Wilde.
44. Dr Bruce Budowle was not asked by the Col to look at yield issues. He was asked to address:
- “the appropriateness of the process by which scientists at Queensland Health Forensic and Scientific Services (QHFSS) are not concentrating samples that have been determined to have concentrations between 0.001 ng/μL and 0.0088 ng/μL and alternatively practices that may be considered appropriate to address or process such low quantity DNA samples.”²⁰*
45. This was the 2018 decision to stop automatically concentrating samples that fell below a high threshold set by QHFSS (ie, the Options Paper outcome). The failed method ceased being used in November 2016, so there was no reason for Dr Budowle to examine Project 13. In fact, he did not receive the Project 13 report.²¹ Dr Budowle was provided with the Project 11 report which was the manual version of the DNA IQ extraction, which was providing good results.
46. When Professor Wilson-Wilde was provided with Dr Budowle’s report on 22 September 2022, I believe she would have easily seen that: a) he was not tasked to look at the yield issues; b) the method he examined was introduced after the failed method ceased being used; c) he did not receive the Project 13 report; and d) he does not make any mention of the failed method from 2007 until 2016. The receipt

¹⁷ Col EXH 129.5, page 8, paragraph 61.

¹⁸ Project 21 and Project 22 clearly shows the method is still failing despite the method changing from a fully automated method to a hybrid manual / automated method.

¹⁹ Attachment 3, Julie Dick media interview 20 September 2023. (00:03:17)

²⁰ Col EXH 31, p2, paragraph 1.

²¹ Col EXH 31, p2-3.

of Dr Budowle's report by Professor Wilson-Wilde on 22 September 2022 was nearly one month prior to the issue of her report to the Col (20 October 2022). Therefore, this provided her with an opportunity to see the issue had not been addressed by Dr Budowle.

47. Professor Wilson-Wilde claims that the Col Final Report had details about Project 13. There is no detail of the systemic DNA recovery failure from 2007 to 2016 or Project 13 in the Col Final Report.

Identification of Cases Affected by Project 13 and Recommendation 105

48. On 8 September 2023 The Australian first reported my concerns relating to Project 13.²² At this stage it was uncertain whether cases affected by Project 13 were included in the Queensland DNA Taskforce's historical case review, which at that time was approximately 30,000.
49. In my opinion, by September 2023 cases affected by Project 13 should have already been included in the case review by FSQ due to Recommendation 105 from the 2022 Col which stated:
- "The laboratory should conduct a retrospective review of positive control extraction batches processed by the MultiProbe® II instrument to determine if this extraction method was performing sub-optimally, and if so, the period of time in which a sub-optimal method was used and whether there is utility in retesting or re-analysing any potentially affected samples."*
50. At the time this recommendation was drafted in 2022, the cause of the failed DNA recovery (Project 13) was unknown.
51. To complete Recommendation 105 FSQ would need to do two things:
- 1) conduct a retrospective review of positive control samples from extraction batches processed by the MultiPROBE II method to determine if it was performing sub-optimally, and if yes then;
 - 2) identify the time period in which the sub-optimal method was used and determine if the samples could be re-tested.
52. In my opinion, the effort required by FSQ to complete Recommendation 105 would be about one day once extraction batch data from 2007 to 2016 was available. Note: the completion of Recommendation 105 does not require the identification of affected cases, or for the review of those cases to have been completed, just the identification of the time period the method was failing.
53. I believe it would have been easy for FSQ experts to detect the DNA recovery failure in the sample data, the period of time the method was failing, and to find the failings had originated in Project 13 document. In my opinion, it would also have been clear that the method had not been fixed by any variations of the initial method since 2007.

²² 'Shandee's Story: The catastrophe called Project 13'. David Murray and Hedely Thomas, 8 September 2023.

I also believe that it would have been apparent to FSQ experts that the results provided by the failed method would have been unreliable, would require re-testing, and addendum statements and results would need to be released to the QPS and the courts.

54. In my opinion, if FSQ had appropriately addressed Recommendation 105, they would have found Project 13, became aware the method was failing from when it was first introduced in 2007, and included all cases affected in the case review.
55. In an interview in early September 2023 Hedley Thomas asked Professor Wilson-Wilde:
- “And does your scope widen now as a result of this learning from what's gone on in Project 13?”* She responded: Linzi Wilson-Wilde: *“Our scope has widened based on our review of Project 13.”*²³
56. In my opinion, this indicates that by early September 2023 cases affected by Project 13 were not included in the Queensland Health DNA Taskforce case review.
57. The inclusion of cases affected by Project 13 did not happen until 5 October 2023, nearly one month after the Project 13 issue was raised publicly by me²⁴. The cases were included after a review was conducted by the QPS on cases dating back to 2007. The total number of cases requiring review was revised up from 30,000 to 37,000.
58. The DNA Advisory Board reviews the progress of Col recommendations and approves strategies to address them. The DNA Advisory Board also signs off when a recommendation is completed. The first DNA Advisory Board met on 28 March 2023, and *‘an interim process for reviewing past or historical cases that may have been impacted by sub-optimal laboratory processes has been developed and operationalised’* by April 2023.²⁵
59. Therefore, by 5 October 2023, when an extra 7,000 cases were identified by QPS as being affected Project 13, FSQ had already commenced review of cases affected by other issues identified in the Col. The cases already part of the 30,000 under review, would also contain cases affected by Project 13 by chance as some cases were affected by multiple issues. In my opinion, it does not make sense that FSQ would start a review of cases without first identifying what all the issues affecting a case may be, otherwise a case would have to be reviewed multiple times for each issue.
60. The Honourable Shannon Fentiman announced on 5 October 2023 that 83% of Col recommendations had either commenced or had been completed.²⁶ This further

²³ Shandee’s Legacy podcast, Episode 11, ‘What Linzi Left Out’. 47:00

²⁴ <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-10-05/queensland-dna-lab-bungle-second-inquiry-expected/102936794> and <https://headtopics.com/au/queensland-to-open-fresh-inquiry-into-forensic-dna-testing-as-compromised-cases-rise-to-nearly-40-00-46038543>

²⁵ ‘Queensland Government First Progress Report, Delivery of Recommendations, Commission of Inquiry into Forensic DNA Testing in Queensland’. Page 8.

²⁶ <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-10-05/queensland-dna-lab-bungle-second-inquiry-expected/102936794>

indicates to me that it was highly likely FSQ had addressed Recommendation 105, but had failed to identify Project 13 and any failures arising from it.

61. If FSQ had failed to appropriately address Recommendation 105, the consequences of this are significant. It would mean many thousands of serious and violent crimes would not be reviewed at all, or if already included in the 30,000 cases under review not have sufficient criteria to identify the DNA recovery failings, and deny the opportunity for samples to be retested to identify offenders. It would also mean that failed results previously released by QHFSS over nine years due to DNA recovery issues, would not be identified, and police and courts would not be informed of the unreliable evidence.
62. This leaves me with some important questions which I believe should be addressed by the Inquiry.
- i. What was done by FSQ to address Recommendation 105?
 - ii. What information was provided to the DNA Advisory Board by FSQ in relation to Recommendation 105?
 - iii. Was Recommendation 105 completed and signed off by the DNA Advisory Board, and if so, when was it signed off as completed?
 - iv. Why weren't cases affected by Project 13 already identified and added to the historical case review prior to it commencing?

Potential impact of the Col not being advised of the Project 13 DNA recovery failures

63. Given the technical nature of the issues being explored by the Col, independent expert witnesses were essential to examine known issues, and discover unknown issues that could impact forensic DNA testing services in Queensland and inform subsequent reforms. Professor Wilson-Wilde is a highly experienced and credentialed forensic biologist, which would have brought a high level of reassurance to the Col in terms of the quality of her analysis, her impartiality, and her ability to communicate her findings accurately and reliably in written and verbal form.
64. In my opinion, there is no evidence that Professor Wilson-Wilde disclosed the DNA recovery failure contained in Project 13 to the Col.
65. The topic entrusted to Professor Wilson-Wilde by the Col to examine and report on was significant: investigating a method critical to obtaining DNA profiles from crime scene evidence, and to determine whether the method produced accurate and reliable results. It was the very reason the Col was triggered.
66. I believe the absence of knowledge by the Col about the DNA recovery issues in Project 13 resulted in, or risked, the following:

- i. Prevented the Col from finding and exploring the most significant technical failing in the history of QHFSS;
- ii. Prevented experts involved in Module 6 from properly completing their examination of the reliability of the Blackburn DNA analysis;
- iii. Risked the development of an incorrect DNA testing strategy for the Blackburn samples for the Coronial investigation which would have led to failed results;
- iv. Risked samples affected by the failed method from other cases over nine years being tested incorrectly wasting significant time, resources, and valuable evidence;
- v. Risked incorrectly re-tested samples providing false and misleading evidence to the police and courts;
- vi. Risked cases affected by the failed method from being identified, appropriately reviewed and retested; and
- vii. Risked serious and violent offenders not being identified, and cases including rape and murder not being resolved;

Dr Kirsty Wright 25 October 2023

Attachment 1: Explanations offered by Professor Wilson-Wilde’s about what advice she provided to the Col about Project 13

The statements below were provided by Professor Wilson-Wilde and were agreed to be used publicly when interviewed by journalists Hedley Thomas and David Murray from The Australian. The statements were offered by Professor Wilson-Wilde to explain what had occurred during the 2022 Col when she reviewed Project 13 while she was an independent expert witness. The statements have been grouped together to assist my understanding of what advice Professor Wilson-Wilde’s provided to the Col about the Project 13 DNA recovery failures. Attachments 2 and 3 have similarly been used to assist my understanding.

Version	Statement
Professor Wilson-Wilde claims she found the DNA yield failure in Project 13 and understood its significance.	<p>²⁷Hedley Thomas: “And what we’re looking at is an order of difference that’s quite extraordinary. For example, 92% less DNA detected with the automated method, 100 times worse sensitivity. Is that what you’ve come to understand as well?”</p> <p>Linzi Wilson-Wilde: “That was one of the findings that I recognised from the project, that there was a significant reduction in DNA yield, from the automated method when compared to the manual method.”</p> <p>Linzi Wilson-Wilde: “There is a significant potential and a real world outcome that introducing a method with such a significant difference in the yield of DNA, that it would have had an impact on the ability to identify and retrieve DNA from crime scene samples.”²⁸</p> <p>²⁹Hedley Thomas: “When you looked at that document, you saw evidence of a wholly flawed method that should ever have been put forward.”</p> <p>Linzi Wilson-Wilde: “Exactly.”</p>

²⁷ Shandee’s Legacy podcast, Episode 11 ‘What Linzi Left Out’. 25:17

²⁸ Shandee’s Legacy podcast, Episode 11 ‘What Linzi Left Out’. 27:49.

²⁹ Shandee’s Legacy podcast, Episode 11 ‘What Linzi Left Out’. 43:19

	<p>³⁰Hedley Thomas: “Would I be correct in saying in 2007, there was catastrophic yield failure as a result of the implementation of the automated method? Would that be correct?”</p> <p>Linzi Wilson-Wilde: “There were definitely issues with the method that was introduced as a result of Project 13 that would have resulted in a significant reduction in DNA yield.”</p>
<p>Professor Wilson-Wilde claims she found Project 13 and the verification of the method was flawed.</p>	<p>“Their report of Project 13, I think the project was flawed from the beginning. A change of that magnitude should have required a full validation, a full in-depth project, to study all aspects of the method to identify limitations to optimise it thoroughly. And so I believe that project was flawed from the beginning. The report was insufficient and not fit for purpose to implement that method in its entirety.”³¹</p> <p>“The validation of the automated method could have been more robust.”³²</p> <p>The new method should “have required a full validation, a full in-depth project to study all aspects of the method to identify limitations, to optimise it thoroughly.”³³</p> <p>“The entire project wasn’t scientifically valid.”³⁴</p>
<p>Professor Wilson-Wilde claims she found the manual method and automated</p>	<p>“I don’t believe the automated method and the manual method for Project 13 were comparable.”³⁵</p> <p>“The abstract was clearly contradictory to the body and the results of the project. Why that’s the case I do not know.”³⁶</p>

³⁰ Shandee’s Legacy podcast, Episode 11 ‘What Linzi Left Out’. 46:10

³¹ Shandee’s Legacy podcast, Episode 11 ‘What Linzi Left Out’. 21:58.

³² Shandee’s Legacy podcast, Episode 11 ‘What Linzi Left Out’. 22:52.

³³ Shandee’s Legacy podcast, Episode 11 ‘What Linzi Left Out’. 23:22

³⁴ Shandee’s Legacy podcast, Episode 11 ‘What Linzi Left Out’. 27:30

³⁵ Shandee’s Legacy podcast, Episode 11 ‘What Linzi Left Out’. 25:10

³⁶ Shandee’s Legacy podcast, Episode 11 ‘What Linzi Left Out’. 26:35.

method in Project 13 were not comparable.	<p>³⁷Linzi Wilson-Wilde: “I thought a number of the statements in the report weren't consistent with the data that was provided in the report.”³⁸</p> <p>Hedley Thomas: “because the abstract said it was comparable.”</p> <p>Linzi Wilson-Wilde: “And it clearly wasn't.”</p>
Professor Wilson-Wilde claims she told the Col of the yield failure in her report.	<p>“My report deals with the whole project. I called out entire project from the title to the recommendations. The project, in my opinion should never have got off the ground. It was incorrectly designed study for that level of change. So my opinion is it shouldn't have even been commenced, let alone the issues that were identified.”³⁹</p>
Professor Wilson-Wilde claims she took Susan Hedge through the Project 13 report section by section.	<p>“In discussions with the Committee of Inquiry counsel assisting, I went through multiple issues and took them through each section of the Project 13 report and the concerns that I had. The Project 13 project was discussed in detail from beginning to end including the yield issues because we went through each section. And in the end, my report focuses on that the project was completely invalid.”⁴⁰</p>
Professor Wilson-Wilde claims she was directed by	<p>“And I guess what I wanted to clarify, I guess, clear up, and I think might be useful given your comments in the email is really when I looked at the documents that I had during the commission of inquiry. My focus was very much put on me on contamination issues.”⁴¹</p>

³⁷ Shandee’s Legacy podcast, Episode 11 ‘What Linzi Left Out’. 45:56

³⁸ Shandee’s Legacy podcast, Episode 11 ‘What Linzi Left Out’. 45:47

³⁹ Shandee’s Legacy podcast, Episode 11 ‘What Linzi Left Out’. 28:52

⁴⁰ Shandee’s Legacy podcast, Episode 11 ‘What Linzi Left Out’. 29:34

⁴¹ Shandee’s Legacy podcast, Episode 11 ‘What Linzi Left Out’. 39:36

the Col to focus on contamination.	
Professor Wilson-Wilde claims she was not asked to yield issues at all.	<p>⁴²Hedley Thomas: “I mean, do you think though the inquiry would have expected you to say, hey, there's also this massive yield problem, you might want to start looking at that because it looks pretty serious.”</p> <p>Linzi Wilson-Wilde: “I wasn't asked to look at a yield issue at all.”</p> <p>Hedley Thomas: “Okay, but isn't it something you'd just want to volunteer anyway? Like, let them know because they don't know what's there until the expert witness tells them.”</p> <p>Linzi Wilson-Wilde: “I wasn't adding anything to the commission of inquiry by raising DNA yield as an issue because they were already looking at it.”</p> <p>Hedley Thomas: “I mean, they almost missed it. It was only in those last days that it got raised. Kirsty's sort of gone back and looked at this stuff. And because she was hoodwinked by that abstract, that misleading summary, did that throw you at the time? Or were you, did you pick up on that being misleading?”</p>
Professor Wilson-Wilde claims the method was fixed so there was no need to raise it to the Col.	<p>“There was a method introduced in 2009, that had improved DNA yields, how that directly compared, I don't have that information.”⁴³</p> <p>“There were quite a number of very significant changes. I have seen documentation that demonstrates the expected versus actual DNA retrieved using later systems, using known samples, and those results appear to be far better than the Project 13 results.”⁴⁴</p>

⁴² Shandee's Legacy podcast, Episode 11 'What Linzi Left Out'. 44:34

⁴³ Shandee's Legacy podcast, Episode 11 'What Linzi Left Out'. 31:50.

⁴⁴ Shandee's Legacy podcast, Episode 11 'What Linzi Left Out'. 32:05

Hedley Thomas: “But are there documents underpinning what you told us earlier, which was that the new system was introduced, that effectively usurped the failing system, that project 13 was based on”.⁴⁵

Linzi Wilson-Wilde: “Yes, I reviewed validation documentation relating to the subsequent methods that were implemented”.

Hedley Thomas: “And they assured you that everything was going to be fine from that point on”.

Linzi Wilson-Wilde: “So it was very robust, more testing, a lot more detailed in its nature, a much more significant study than the original project 13.”

Hedley Thomas: “She explained that she had noted the lab's decision after the contamination crisis to revert to a part manual part automated process for testing. And it was this change, she said, which had led her to the view that the yield problems were at least partially resolved by 2009 such that they would not have had a bearing or much of a bearing on Shandee's case or thousands of other cases”.

Linzi Wilson-Wilde: “Whilst DNA yield could still be an issue, and please, I'll make this clear that I do think DNA yield is one of the issues that has persisted in the laboratory, through that period of time, coupled to other issues that I see are potentially there as well. And that's why I was making the comments that I didn't think at the, when I was looking at the commission of Inquiry that the that 92% differential would still be that big when you're using a half manual process.”

Hedley Thomas: “Professor Wilson-Wilde was saying that she did not bring the yield catastrophe to the attention of the DNA inquiry, nor even put it in her report, because of her view that the yield would have been improving. Although she could not say to what extent it would have been improving. But in our view, all of it is academic anyway, because whatever Professor Wilson-Wilde understood or believed, at the time that she did her work as an expert witness, she wrote, in our view, only fluffy things in her report.”

“Would it be fair to say or just summarise then that, from what you can see of the change in method, the yield that was failing catastrophically early on, must have improved after the change in method in 2009, to what extent it improved, is still a bit uncertain.”

⁴⁵ Shandee's Legacy podcast, Episode 11 'What Linzi Left Out'. 32:25 to 32:53.

	Linzi Wilson-Wilde: “Exactly. So hopefully, I'm hoping I've explained enough in terms of why the Commission of Inquiry, I didn't specifically focus on the yield issue, clearly noted, but not unexpected, given what they were trying to do. And what they were trying to do was flawed.”
Professor Wilson-Wilde knew another scientist (Dr Bruce Budowle) addressed the yield issues for the Col.	Retired District Court judge Julie Dick: “In fact, there were many scientists who gave evidence before the inquiry and gave reports – and Dr Budowle on September 15, 2022 gave a report which dealt with the yield issues.” “Professor Wilson-Wilde had that report from September 22. She then received instructions to prepare a report and she was steered in the questions towards the issue of contamination. And she dealt with that. She knew that another scientist had dealt with the yield issues and she was looking at, specifically, contamination over a period of time.” ⁴⁶
Professor Wilson-Wilde claims finding a difference in DNA recovery between a fully automated method and a manual method is expected.	“But finding a clear difference between a manual and a fully automated process wasn't surprising.” ⁴⁷
Professor Wilson-Wilde claims the	

⁴⁶ ‘Explanation for DNA lab’s new chief discredited by evidence’, Hedley Thomas and David Murraru. The Australian, 25 October 2023.

<https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/explanation-for-dna-labs-new-chief-discredited-by-evidence/news-story/1282e5620b3541bfaf605212cb7e15a3>

⁴⁷ Shandee’s Legacy podcast, Episode 11 ‘What Linzi Left Out’. 40:58.

<p>Project 13 yield issues were included in the Col Final Report and claims the DNA Advisory Board knew of the Project 13 yield failure.</p>	<p>⁴⁸Hedley Thomas: “Until it was raised by me with Walter Sofronoff and with you, was the Advisory Board aware of Project 13?”</p> <p>Linzi Wilson-Wilde: “I’m not sure whether the Advisory Board was aware of Project 13 in detail, there was certainly if they’d read the Commission of Inquiry Report, they would see that.”</p> <p>⁴⁹Hedley Thomas: “And does your scope widen now as a result of this learning from what’s gone on in Project 13?”</p> <p>Linzi Wilson-Wilde: “Our scope has widened based on our review of Project 13.”</p>
--	---

⁴⁸ Shandee’s Legacy podcast, Episode 11 ‘What Linzi Left Out’. 47:23

⁴⁹ Shandee’s Legacy podcast, Episode 11 ‘What Linzi Left Out’. 47:00

Attachment 2: Written Statement from Professor Linzi Wilson-Wilde

"I provided expert opinion evidence to the forensic DNA commission of inquiry in the utmost of good faith, truthfully, and in accordance with my instructions provided to me by the commissioner on 12 October 2022. I provided my opinion based on my 25 years experience in forensic science. My instructions from the commissioner directed me to concerns about the cause of and response to contamination issues following a DNA extraction method used at the laboratory in around 2008. I provided my report on 20 October 2022. My evidence to the Commission of Inquiry identified that Project 13 was flawed and not consistent with expected good practice.

At no stage did I approach Queensland Health for paid employment. I was offered the role of leading the newly established entity, Forensic Science Queensland in December 2022. On around 14 November 2022, I attended a discussion at the request of a member of the task force. It was a very general discussion about the proposed new structure of the laboratory, the potential creation of an advisory board, whether I might have interest in a role as a paid chair on that advisory board if it was established, and whether I could suggest other suitably qualified and eminent scientists who might have the expertise to be involved. I'm aware that the experts who provided evidence to the commission were similarly approached. After that meeting, and in response to a request, Dr. Rebecca Kogios and I provided a list of 16 possible local and international candidates, which included us. I did not ever receive any formal invitation or formal offer to be a member of the advisory board.

Towards the end of November 2022, I provided feedback about proposed Terms of Reference for an advisory board. Also, to the best of my recollection, I believe some time in November 2022 I was contacted about my interest in a Director position to assist with implementing the commissioner recommendations. I declined.

I'm dedicated and determined to ensure that the recommendations of the commission of inquiry are fully implemented. With the guidance of the interim advisory board co chaired by Walter Sofronoff KC and Julie Dick SC my aim is to create a world leading forensic testing service that will deliver for our criminal justice system and make Queensland proud. I refute in the strongest possible terms that my evidence in relation to this matter was misleading to the commission of inquiry. I refute in the strongest possible terms, any imputation regarding my integrity and independence in providing my expert opinion evidence to the commission of inquiry."⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Shandee's Legacy podcast, Episode 11 'What Linzi Left Out'. 1:17:33

Attachment 3: Transcript of Media Conference with Julie Dick on 20 September 2023

[00:00:00] **Julie Dick** I'm co-chair of the DNA Advisory Board and the DNA Forensic Justice Board Subcommittee.

[00:00:08] **Male TV reporter** Julie, what's what's your initial assessment of these claims that have been raised today by Dr Kirsty Wright?

[00:00:15] **Julie Dick** I haven't heard her speak today, but I know what the original issue raised was.

[00:00:22] **Julie Dick** And the Commission of Inquiry looked at certain issues, constrained by time, of course.

[00:00:31] **Julie Dick** The criticism is that Professor Wilson-Wilde gave a report to the Commission of Inquiry about a project called Project 13 where she discussed contamination issues but failed to highlight yield - low yield - issues.

[00:00:47] **Julie Dick** In fact, there were many scientists who gave evidence before the inquiry and gave reports and a professor, sorry, Dr Budowle's, on the 15th of September 2022, gave a report which dealt with the yield issues.

[00:01:07] **Julie Dick** Professor Wilson-Wilde had that report from the 22nd of September.

[00:01:12] **Julie Dick** She then had, received, instructions to prepare a report. And she was steered in the questions towards the issue of contamination.

[00:01:22] **Julie Dick** And she dealt with that.

[00:01:23] **Julie Dick** She had eight days to prepare that. Everyone at the Forensic Science Queensland is aware of the issue.

[00:01:33] **Julie Dick** They, when they re-examine these samples, they are aware of those issues.

[00:01:38] **Julie Dick** And will have them firmly in mind.

[00:01:41] **Julie Dick** I will say it did not make one ounce of difference to the recommendations made by the Commission of Inquiry.

[00:01:50] **Male TV reporter** In your view, should should Professor Wilson-Wilde have looked at the yield matter or you're saying that the questions that she was required to answer were more about the contamination?

[00:02:03] **Julie Dick** Well she knew that another scientist had dealt with the yield issues and she was looking at specifically contamination over a period of time, 2000 up to 2008, I think.

[00:02:25] **Male TV reporter** In your view has the scope of the complete Commission of Inquiry has that covered all the angles that need to be looked at after these revelations.

[00:02:35] **Julie Dick** The Commission of Inquiry concentrated on a certain number of issues because of time constraints.

[00:02:42] **Julie Dick** But it is not the case that Forensic Science Queensland is not aware of the issues. They certainly are aware of the issues.

[00:02:49] **Julie Dick** And when they retest and re-examine, they are aware of these issues.

[00:02:57] **Male TV reporter** And Julia, did you? Oh, sorry.

[00:03:01] **Female TV reporter** Are you sure? I can wait? Julie. I just wanted to see have you, did you get a chance - know there is a whole bunch of documents -did you get a chance to look at Professor Wilson-Wilde's report?

[00:03:14] **Julie Dick** No. They're Commission of Inquiry documents.

[00:03:17] **Julie Dick** I have discussed it with her. With Mr Sofronoff.

[00:03:21] **Julie Dick** But I haven't actually seen it, the report.

[00:03:30] **Julie Dick** I will tell you that the DNA Advisory Board has very eminent international and interstate scientists. I've been to every meeting.

[00:03:39] **Julie Dick** So does the Forensic Justice Board. I've been to every meeting.

[00:03:43] **Julie Dick** There has been not one skerrick of criticism of Professor Wilson-Wilde. And in fact, only support for her.

[00:03:54] **Female TV reporter** In her report there is a sub heading about whether DNA profiles obtained by the lab are reliable and accurate when looking. I guess that's through the work of the automated DNA extraction method.

[00:04:08] **Julie Dick** Yes

[00:04:10] **Female TV reporter** She does raise concerns but she also said 'I do not find any significant failings that would indicate that the final results released were not reliable'.

[00:04:21] **Female TV reporter** She was later in the podcast to Hedley Thomas from The Australian, she said it was a flawed system.

[00:04:28] **Female TV reporter** That Project 13 was flawed, but she didn't use that way flawed in that report. So I guess that's why there have been questions raised.

[00:04:37] **Female TV reporter** Can you see why there would be those concerns?

[00:04:40] **Julie Dick** Not now that I know the explanation.

[00:04:43] **Julie Dick** And she was speaking about the verification and validation of that whole project, which she said then was non-scientific in my words.

[00:04:56] **Julie Dick** But I know that Dr Budowle gave his report on the 15th of September relating particularly to DNA yield. '.

[00:05:07] **Julie Dick** And he and Jo Veth also gave reports in respect of the Shandee Blackburn matter - and in respect of the yield.

[00:05:18] **Julie Dick** There might be areas where the commission of inquiry did not get in every dark corner, but it would not have made one bit of difference to the recommendations.

[00:05:31] **Female TV reporter** Why are you so confident about it? Because Dr Kirsty Wright, I guess, the whistle blower in all of this, she said that Project 13 didn't get enough attention.

[00:05:40] **Female TV reporter** And it was basically one of the major, if not the mjaor thing that should have come under close scrutiny.

[00:05:50] **Julie Dick** Well, I would say that that's not down to Professor Wilson-Wilde.

[00:05:54] **Julie Dick** You'd have to know how the reports were requested.

[00:05:59] **Julie Dick** And as I keep saying, the Commission of Inquiry could only deal with a limited number of areas.

[00:06:08] **Julie Dick** Enough to identify that the lab had to be rebuilt. And that is happening.

[00:06:17] **Female TV reporter** And just just to be clear, so Professor Wilson-Wilde has your support to stay in her job at the lab as boss?

[00:06:24] **Julie Dick** Absolutely.

[00:06:26] **Julie Dick** She has enormous commitment, intelligence and integrity.

[00:06:30] **Julie Dick** And I'm speaking for myself.

[00:06:32] **Julie Dick** But I can tell you, I've been to every meeting and the attitude to her from eminent scientists and lawyers has been the same.

[00:06:48] **Female TV reporter** That's all I have

[00:06:50] **Male TV reporter** Yeah. Thanks very much, Julie. That's really helpful.